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JUST PUNISHMENT: RICKS V. SHOVER AND THE NEED FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO GUARD-ON-INMATE PRISON
SEXUAL ABUSE
JONATHAN T. RUTTER*
“[T]he sexual abuse of prisoners, once overlooked as a distasteful blight on
the prison system, offends our most basic principles of just punishment.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: HOW GUARD-ON-INMATE SEXUAL ABUSE INCAPACITATES
PRISONS
The lock on a cell door went “click.”2 It had been remotely activated, as a
warning, by a prison guard keeping watch as a lookout.3 Inside the cell, a second
prison guard knew exactly what his accomplice was telling him: someone was
about to discover him sexually assaulting a prisoner inside her cell, and he needed
to escape to avoid detection.4 According to reports, at least one prison guard used
this method to cover up his sexual abuses of female prisoners while working at
the Lackawanna County Prison in Scranton, Pennsylvania.5
Just this year, seven prison officials were charged with sexually abusing
prisoners at the Lackawanna County Prison.6 The allegations of misconduct go
back decades and involve prison officials systematically abusing female inmates
at the prison, not only in the darkness of utility closets, but openly in cells.7 The
abuse was “common and widely known” and facilitated by the complicity of other
guards.8
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; M.A., 2017,
Binghamton University; B.A., 2013, State University of New York College at Buffalo. This
Note is dedicated to my wife, Jen Rutter, who believes in me when I do not believe in myself,
and to my parents, Thomas Rutter and Beth Anne Rutter, who have always been a source of
encouragement and support in my life. I would additionally like to thank all of the members of
the Villanova Law Review who provided invaluable assistance in the preparation and
publication of this Note.
1. Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 260 (2d Cir. 2015).
2. Matthew Haag, 7 Prison Guards in Pennsylvania Charged with Sexually Abusing
Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/pennsylvaniaprison-guards-sexual-abuse.html (reporting on criminal investigation into sexual abuse
allegedly committed by multiple corrections officers at Lackawanna County Prison in Scranton,
Pennsylvania).
3 See id. (describing plot by prison guard to avoid detection of sexual abuse of inmate in
cell).
4. See id. (describing method used by prison guard to warn other guard that he was going
to be caught sexually abusing prisoner).
5. See id. (reporting that correctional officer who allegedly devised plot worked at
Lackawanna County Prison for over a decade and used this method during that time).
6. See id. (noting that victims of alleged abuse filed lawsuit against some guards at
Lackawanna County Prison).
7. See id. (reporting on fact that some prison officials abused inmates in their own cells).
8. Id. (describing fact that allegations were reportedly common knowledge among prison
staff). In a civil action arising from these abuses, one of the victim inmates claimed that guards

(34)
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Unfortunately, the Lackawanna County Prison is not unique.9 The number
of allegations of sexual abuse in American correctional facilities has risen
dramatically over the past decade.10 Even more troubling, almost half of all
sexual abuse allegations in American prisons involve correctional staff as the
perpetrators.11
Sexual abuse in prisons has incurred significant attention in recent decades.12
Several commentators have noted the negative cultural and social implications of
prison sexual abuse.13 The federal government and most states have enacted
destroyed her complaints when she reported her allegations to an assistant warden at the prison.
See id.; see also Terrie Morgan-Besecker, Lackawanna County Prison Guard Says He Was
Fired for Reporting Sexual Abuse, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.thetimes-tribune.com/news/lackawanna-county-prison-guard-says-he-was-firedfor-reporting-sexual-abuse-1.2376309 (reporting allegations of prison guard who claimed he
was fired from Lackawanna County Prison for reporting guards who were sexually abusing
inmates).
9. See, e.g., Julie K. Brown, You Do It “To Survive.” Ex-Inmate at Florida Women’s
Prison Tells How Staff Extorted Sex, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/special-reports/florida-prisons/article216807755.html
(discussing criminal investigation of assistant warden who allegedly extorted sex from female
inmate by threatening detention and loss of gain time at Lowell Correctional Institution in
Marion County, Florida); Ex-Federal Jail Guard Convicted of Sexually Abusing Inmates,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(May
14,
2018),
https://www.apnews.com/085a8bd9aedc4aadb2d8d74a5f472881 (discussing convictions of
three prison officials who abused female inmates at Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn,
New York); Carol Marbin Miller & Audra D.S. Burch, They Were Stalkers, Sexters and Rapists
– and Worked Safeguarding Florida Delinquents, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/special-reports/florida-prisons/article177887586.html
(reporting prison guards’ abuse of inmates across Florida juvenile detention centers, including
one guard who sexually abused at least nine young girls at Milton Girls Juvenile Residential
Facility).
10. See Ramona Rantala, Sexual Victimization Reported by Adult Correctional
OF
JUST.
STAT.
(July
25,
2018),
Authorities,
2012-2015,
BUREAU
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=6326 (describing rise in allegations of both
inmate-on-inmate and staff-on-inmate sexual victimization in American correctional facilities,
as well as increase in number of substantiated allegations).
11. See id. (noting that 42% of substantiated inmate allegations of sexual abuse were
perpetrated by staff members); see also Liz Fields, Half of Sexual Abuse Claims in American
NEWS
(Jan.
26,
2014),
Prisons
Involve
Guards,
Study
Says,
ABC
https://abcnews.go.com/US/half-sexual-abuse-claims-american-prisons-involveguards/story?id=21892170 (detailing research into guard-on-inmate sexual abuse
demonstrating that just under half of allegations involve correctional officials).
12. See generally Megan Coker, Common Sense About Common Decency: Promoting a
New Standard for Guard-on-Inmate Sexual Abuse Under the Eighth Amendment, 100 VA. L.
REV. 437, 440 (2014) (arguing that courts placing emphasis on injury in sexual abuse claims
has “disparate impact on inmates”, including contributing to harmful gender disparity); Haag,
supra note 2 (reporting on sexual abuse at Pennsylvania prison). For a discussion of how sexual
abuse in prisons has gained recent attention, see infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Heidi Lee Cain, Women Confined by Prison Bars and Male Images, 18 TEX.
J. WOMEN & L. 103, 104-105 (2008) (describing cultural implications of how prisons treat
female inmates and arguing that women behind bars are seen as inherently sexual objects);
Coker, supra note 12 (arguing that courts placing emphasis on injury in sexual abuse claims has
“disparate impact on inmates”, including contributing to harmful gender disparity). See
generally Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139 (2006) (arguing
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legislation proscribing guard-on-inmate sexual contact.14 Additionally, several
United States appellate courts have ruled that guard-on-inmate sexual contact
may violate the Constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment.15
Similarly, in Ricks v. Shover,16 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether guard-on-inmate sexual abuse violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.17 In holding that it can, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals joined several other circuits in providing a potential
remedy for inmates who have been deprived of their Eighth Amendment rights
by being sexually assaulted by correctional staff.18 Employing the reasoning
from the Supreme Court’s excessive force jurisprudence, the Ricks court qualified

that incarceration is inherently “sexual punishment” because sexual coercion is endemic to the
experience of imprisonments). See also Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the
Pleasing Fiction of Guideline Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 562-65 (2006) (discussing
purposes of punishment and arguing that no legitimate penological purpose supports sexual
assault in prison as a legitimate incident of incarceration).
14. See generally Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (establishing federal
response to increasing rates of prison sexual assault); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND STAT. ANN. §
3124.2(a) (West 2012) (providing criminal penalty for correctional officers who commit
“indecent contact” with an inmate); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-3(b) (West 2018) (providing
criminal penalty for correctional officers who commit “an act of sexual contact” with an
inmate). For further citations to and descriptions of federal and state legislation that provides
criminal sanctions for prison officials who engage in sexual contact with victims, see infra note
38 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding “intentional
contact with an inmate’s genitalia or other intimate area, which serves no penological purpose
and is undertaken with the intent to gratify the officer’s sexual desire or humiliate the inmate,
violates the Eighth Amendment”); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding “severe or repetitive sexual abuse” of inmate by prison official can violate Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d
1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that sexual abuse of inmate violates Eighth Amendment
and that officers engaging in such conduct are not entitled to qualified immunity); Giron v.
Corrs Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding inmate claims for sexual
abuse may arise under Supreme Court excessive force jurisprudence); Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d
1335, 1138 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding inmates may have cause of action under Eighth Amendment
for sexual abuse by prison officials when such abuse caused injury); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105
F.3d 857, 859 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding inmates may make Eighth Amendment claim for
sexual abuse by corrections officer, but holding no such deprivation occurred in that case).
16. 891 F.3d 468 (3d Cir. 2018).
17. See id. at 479 (holding sexual abuse of prisoner by prison official may violate the
Eighth Amendment, but single act of prison official rubbing his clothed erect penis against
inmate’s buttocks during pat-down search is not sufficiently serious to support claim under
Eighth Amendment). Specifically, the plaintiff brought a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for deprivation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
See id. at 472 (describing Ricks’s complaint and procedural history of present case). See
generally U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1996) (providing private cause of action for people deprived of their constitutional rights by
those acting “under color of” state law).
18. See Ricks, 891 F.3d at 473 (“Today, we join numerous sister Circuits in holding that
prison sexual abuse can violate the Constitution.”).
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its holding, stating that “even if sexualized touching lacks a penological purpose,
it may still fall below the threshold of constitutional cognizability based on a lack
of objective seriousness.”19
This Note analyzes the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Ricks, as well as the test
the court employed to evaluate whether a guard’s conduct violates the Eighth
Amendment.20 Given society’s evolving standards of decency and the categorical
difference between sexual abuse and excessive force, this Note argues that the
Third Circuit erred in concluding that guard-on-inmate sexual contact is
constitutionally permissible if such conduct is not objectively serious.21 Part II
of this Note provides a background on sexual abuse in prisons, as well as judicial
and legislative responses to this pervasive problem.22 Part III examines the
factual and procedural background of Ricks.23 Part IV discusses the reasoning
the Ricks court employed in reaching its decision.24 Part V provides a critical
analysis of the court’s reasoning and advocates for an alternative test in cases of
alleged sexual abuse of prisoners.25 Finally, Part VI considers the impact of the
Ricks court’s decision in establishing barriers to the vindication of inmates’
constitutional rights.26
II. BACKGROUND: THE LEGAL SYSTEM’S ATTEMPT TO DETER PRISON SEXUAL
ABUSE
The rate of sexual abuse of inmates has risen dramatically in recent
decades.27 The legal system has confronted this problem in a number of different
ways, including criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits for the vindication of
inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights.28 However, the Supreme Court has never
19. Id. at 475-76 (reasoning that sexual abuse claims under Eighth Amendment must
satisfy objective and subjective prongs). The court concluded that Ricks’s complaint did not
clearly allege abuse rising to a level prohibited by the Constitution, appearing instead to be
“isolated” and “momentary.” Id. at 479.
20. See id. at 474 (describing two-part test comprised of objective and subjective prong
analyzing seriousness of actor’s conduct and mental state, respectively).
21. For a complete argument that proof of objective seriousness should not be required to
establish an Eighth Amendment sexual abuse claim, see infra notes 135–181 and accompanying
text.
22. For a description of the factual and legal background of Eighth Amendment claims
alleging sexual abuse, see infra notes 27–105 and accompanying text.
23. For a recounting of the underlying facts and procedural posture of Ricks, see infra
notes 106–122 and accompanying text.
24. For a narrative analysis of the court’s reasoning in Ricks, see infra notes 123–134 and
accompanying text.
25. For a critical analysis of the Ricks court’s decision, as well as a proposed alternative
test in cases of guard-on-inmate sexual abuse, see infra notes 135–181 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the impact of the Ricks decision on future Eighth Amendment
sexual abuse claims, see infra notes 182–187 and accompanying text.
27. See Rantala, supra note 10 (detailing rise in sexual abuse allegations in American
prisons). For a discussion of the rise in sexual abuse allegations in American correctional
facilities, see infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 260 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding inmate
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articulated a definite rule for judging civil claims for prison sexual abuse, and the
circuit courts have employed subtly different tests in such cases.29
A. The Incidence of Sexual Abuse in Prisons
According to a 2018 Justice Department study, there has been a significant
rise in inmate allegations of sexual assault in American correctional facilities
between 2011-2015.30 The study found that there were 24,661 allegations of
sexual abuse in American correctional facilities in 2015.31 This number was up
nearly 300% from the 8,768 allegations recorded in 2011.32 Significantly, just
under half of the substantiated allegations involved abuse by correctional
officials.33
These statistics are reflected in a spate of high-profile prosecutions of
correctional officers alleged to have sexually abused inmates at their prisons.34
For example, six correctional officers at the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility in
New Jersey were recently indicted for sexually abusing prisoners.35 Additionally,

stated cause of action under Eighth Amendment by alleging correctional officer fondled
inmate’s genitals for personal gratification). For further discussion of the legal response to
sexual abuse in prisons, see infra notes 37–105 and accompanying text.
29. Compare Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 476 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[E]ven if sexualized
touching lacks a penological purpose, it may still fall below the threshold of constitutional
cognizability based on a lack of objective seriousness.”), with Crawford, 796 F.3d at 254 (“A
corrections officer’s intentional contact with an inmate’s genitalia or other intimate area, which
serves no penological purpose and is undertaken with the intent to gratify the officer’s sexual
desire or humiliate the inmate, violates the Eighth Amendment.”).
30. See Rantala, supra note 10 (describing rise in allegations of both inmate–on–inmate
and staff–on–inmate sexual victimization in American correctional facilities, as well as increase
in number of substantiated allegations). In the Prison Rape Elimination Act, Congress
mandated that the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the Department of Justice compile this
information. See 34 U.S.C. § 30303(a) (2017) (requiring the Bureau of Justice Statistics to
annually complete “comprehensive statistical review and analysis of the incidence and effects
of prison rape”).
31. See Rantala, supra note 10 (reporting that there were 1,473 substantiated allegations
in 2015, which reflected a 63% increase from 902 substantiated allegations in 2011).
32. See id. (“The number of allegations in prisons increased from 6,660 in 2011 to 18,666
in 2015 (up 180%).”).
33. See id. (stating that 42% of substantiated allegations were perpetrated by staff
members at correctional facilities).
34. See, e.g., Casey Quinlan, Sexual Assault of Inmates by Staff Is Prevalent and Often
Goes Unpunished: Six Officers at the Same New Jersey Facility Have Been Indicted for Sexual
Abuse of Female Inmates, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 5, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/prisonguard-sexual-assault-e824a2d7006a/ (describing investigation and charges brought against six
corrections officials at a prison, including one who had worked as corrections officer since
2000).
35. See id. (discussing story of abuse by corrections officers at New Jersey’s Edna Mahan
Correctional Facility). Two guards have already been convicted of sexually abusing inmates at
Edna Mahan Correctional Facility. See David Foster, Corrections Officer Found Guilty of
Raping Inmate at Edna Mahan Women’s Prison, THE TRENTONIAN (May 10, 2018),
https://www.trentonian.com/news/corrections-officer-found-guilty-of-raping-inmate-at-ednamahan/article_9c8f1a62-17bf-595a-8d4c-6418ed7884f3.html (recounting conviction of one
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as discussed above, seven correctional officials at the Lackawanna County Prison
were indicted for sexually abusing inmates.36
B. Legal Responses
The legal system has responded to the epidemic of sexual abuse in American
correctional institutions through both legislation and judicial interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.37 State and
federal governments have passed laws to address the sexual abuse of prisoners.38
Furthermore, courts have increasingly recognized that sexual abuse may
implicate a prisoner’s Eighth-Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

former guard for raping inmate, as well as previous conviction of another guard in 2017).
36. For a discussion of the abuse allegations at the Lackawanna County Prison, see supra
notes 2–8 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30309 (2018) (providing
federal response to rape in prisons in United States); Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 260
(2d Cir. 2015) (holding inmate stated cause of action under Eighth Amendment by alleging
correctional officer fondled inmate’s genitals for personal gratification). For further discussion
on legal responses to sexual abuse in prisons, see infra notes 37–105 and accompanying text.
38. The federal government addressed sexual contact in the Prison Rape Elimination Act.
See 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (2017) (identifying purpose of Act to “establish a zero-tolerance standard
for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States”). Every state forbids at least
some form of sexual contact between guards and inmates. See ALA. CODE § 14-11-31(a)
(2018); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.427(a) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1419(A) (2018);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-217(a)(2) (2009); CAL. PENAL CODE § 289.6(a)(2) (West 2015);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-701(1) (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-73a(a) (2013); D.C. CODE
§ 22-3014 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-65.1(b)(5) (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-732(1)(e) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 186110(1) (West 2018); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-9.2(a) (West 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 3344.1-3-10(c)(2) (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.16(1) (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-5512(a) (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.120(1) (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:134.1(A) (2010); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 255-A(1) (2016); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 3314(b)(2) (West 2018); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268 § 21A (West 2018); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.520c(1) (West 2013) (criminalizing generally sexual contact when actor had
authority over victim); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.345 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3104(1) (West 2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.145(1) (West 2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5502 (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-322.01 (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
212.187(2) (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:3 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:142, 2C:14-3 (West 2018); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3) (McKinney 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-27.31(b) (West 2015) (criminalizing generally sexual contact where actor had
“custody” over victim); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-07(1)(d) (West 2018); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A) (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.454(1) (West 2018); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. AND STAT. ANN. § 3124.2(a) (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-1150(B)
(2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.6 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-408(b) (West
2018); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.04(a) (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-412(4)(a),
76-5-412(5) (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3257(a) (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-67.4(A) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.170(1) (West 2014); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-8B-10(a) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2)(h) (West 2018); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-304(a) (West 2018). Four states only criminalize sexual penetration, rather than
sexual contact between guards and inmates generally. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 780A
(2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(E) (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(7) (West
2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-25-24 (West 2018).
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punishment.39
1.

Legislation

Congress has taken an active role in describing the contours of a valid prison
sentence, including defining the lawful purposes for sentencing and proscribing
certain unlawful incidents to a prisoner’s sentence.40 For example, in the
Sentencing Reform Act, Congress provided sentencing judges with a description
of valid purposes for criminal punishment that a judge should consider in
imposing a sentence, including retribution to promote respect for the law and to
provide just punishment, deterrence of future crimes, incapacitation of the
offender, and rehabilitation of the defendant.41 Moreover, through the Prison
Rape Elimination Act, Congress sought to prevent rape in United States prisons.42
Notably, the Prison Rape Elimination Act adopts an expansive definition of
“rape” that includes the sexualized touching of an inmate’s “genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks.”43 Finally, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
39. See, e.g., Crawford, 796 F.3d at 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding guard-on-inmate
sexualized contact violates Eighth Amendment when no penological purpose and guard had
wrongful intent); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding “severe or
repetitive sexual abuse” of inmate by prison official can violate Eighth Amendment); Schwenk
v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding sexual abuse of inmate violates Eighth
Amendment); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
inmate claims for sexual abuse may arise under Supreme Court excessive force jurisprudence);
Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1138 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding inmates may have cause of action
under Eighth Amendment for sexual abuse by prison officials when such abuse caused injury);
Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 859 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding inmates may make Eighth
Amendment claim for sexual abuse by corrections officer, but holding no such deprivation
occurred here). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (proscribing infliction of “cruel and
unusual punishments”).
40. See Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30309 (2018) (providing
federal response to rape in prisons in United States); Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553
(2018) (describing factors judges must weigh in imposing criminal sentence).
41. See Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2018) (describing
justifications for criminal punishment, including “(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; (D) and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”).
42. See Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (2018) (stating that purposes of
Act are to “(1) establish a zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in
the United States; (2) make the prevention of prison rape a top priority in each prison system;
[and] . . . (7) protect the Eighth Amendment rights of Federal, State, and local prisoners . . .”).
The Prison Rape Elimination Act also mandates the gathering of information relating to prison
sexual abuse. See id. § 30303(a)(1) (requiring Department of Justice to prepare “a
comprehensive statistical review and analysis of the incidence and effects of prison rape”). The
Act also provides funds to be made available to the states to achieve the Act’s purposes. See
id. § 30305(a) (providing grants for “personnel, training, technical assistance, data collection,
and equipment to prevent and prosecute prison rape”).
43. See id. § 30309(9), (11) (defining “rape” to include “sexual fondling,” which is
defined as “the touching of the private body parts of another person (including the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks) for the purpose of sexual gratification”).
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inmates may bring private civil actions against any person who, under color of
state law, has subjected them to a deprivation of their Eighth Amendment rights.44
States have similarly promulgated legislation to combat prison sexual
abuse.45 Every state (and the District of Columbia) has enacted statutes imposing
criminal penalties for correctional officers who engage in sex acts with
prisoners.46 Of these, all but four states broadly prohibit sexual contact between
correctional officers and inmates; those four other states opt instead to narrowly
criminalize sexual penetration.47
2.

The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court has never expressly ruled on whether guard-on-inmate
sexual contact deprives prisoners of their Eighth Amendment rights.48
Nevertheless, in Farmer v. Brennan,49 the Supreme Court held that a correctional
officer’s failure to prevent one inmate from sexually abusing another could
violate the Eighth Amendment.50 In Farmer, a transsexual inmate was raped by
fellow prisoners.51 In holding that correctional officers may be liable for inmateon-inmate sexual abuse, the Court reasoned that the relevant inquiry in assessing
liability is whether the correctional officers were aware of a risk of harm to the
inmate, yet disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to
mitigate it.52 Although the opinion did not address whether guard-on-inmate

44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing private cause of action against any “person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”).
45. For citations to relevant state statutes, see supra note 38.
46. See Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 259 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing that all but
two states criminalize guard-on-inmate sexual contact). The District of Columbia also
criminalizes this conduct. See id. For citations to state laws criminalizing sexual contact
between inmates and corrections officers, see supra note 38.
47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 780A (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(E) (West
2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(7) (West 2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-25-24 (West
2018).
48. Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473-74 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that Supreme Court has
never addressed question of whether sexual abuse of prisoner by prison official may rise to the
level of constitutional violation).
49. 511 U.S. 825 (1970).
50. See id. at 828 (stating corrections officers may be liable under Eighth Amendment for
inmate-on-inmate sexual abuse when officers were aware of substantial risk to abused inmate).
51. See id. at 829-30 (describing that incident occurred soon after inmate was transferred
from one prison to another and subsequently moved from administrative segregation into
general population).
52. See id. at 847 (“Accordingly, we reject petitioner’s arguments and hold that a prison
official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of
confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”). The Court adopted a subjective,
rather than objective, standard for “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment
because a subjective standard best aligns with the text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. See id. at 837-838 (“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should
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sexual contact could violate the Eighth Amendment, Farmer nevertheless
established the principle that sexual abuse could—under certain circumstances—
deprive prisoners of their Eighth Amendment rights.53
In the absence of more specific guidance regarding guard-on-inmate sexual
abuse, it is important to consider the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in general.54 The Eighth Amendment is often implicated in capital
punishment cases, and the Supreme Court has long interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to categorically forbid imposing the death penalty when its
application would be disproportionate to the crime.55 For example, in Atkins v.
Virginia,56 the Court found the death penalty unconstitutional when imposed on
mentally disabled defendants.57 However, the Supreme Court has not restricted
its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence merely to analysis of the death penalty; the
Court has also recognized that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
prohibits certain conditions of a prisoner’s confinement that are “incompatible
with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.’”58
In 1976, in Estelle v. Gamble,59 the Court first recognized that an inmate’s
treatment in prison—unrelated to the sentence itself—could violate the Cruel and

have perceived but did not . . . cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of
punishment.”).
53. See id. at 847 (delineating circumstances where sexual abuse gives rise to potential
Eighth Amendment claim). Numerous federal appellate cases cite Farmer when applying the
Eighth Amendment to instances of guard-on-inmate sexual abuse. See, e.g., Ricks, 891 F.3d at
473-74; Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir.
1999); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997).
54. For an overview of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see infra
notes 55–76 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412-13 (2008) (holding that death
penalty is unconstitutional when applied in cases of child rape in which crime did not result,
and was not intended to result, in victim’s death); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 579 (2005)
(holding that death penalty is unconstitutional when imposed on offenders under eighteen years
old); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that imposition of death penalty on
“mentally retarded” offenders is unconstitutional); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410
(1986) (concluding that imposing death penalty on mentally insane defendant is
unconstitutional); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that
imposition of death penalty for rape of adult woman, when victim was not killed, is
unconstitutionally disproportionate). But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987)
(holding that imposition of death penalty on offenders convicted of felony murder, who were
major participants in felony and exhibited reckless indifference to human life, is constitutional).
56. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
57. See id. at 321 (holding that imposing death penalty on “mentally retarded” offenders
is unconstitutional).
58. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion)) (finding that Eighth Amendment forbids “more than
physically barbarous punishments”). Additionally, the Court reasoned that punishments violate
the Eighth Amendment when they “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id.
at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
59. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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Unusual Punishments Clause.60 In Estelle, the Court held that denial of medical
treatment to prisoners by correctional staff may deprive prisoners of their Eighth
Amendment rights.61 In doing so, the Court emphasized that the unnecessary
infliction of suffering, which can happen through failure to attend to medical
needs, “is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency.”62
In Rhodes v. Chapman,63 the Court applied Estelle’s “contemporary
standards of decency” test to a factual scenario where inmates were double
bunked in one cell.64 In holding that housing two inmates in one cell is
constitutional, the Rhodes court reasoned that conditions of confinement that are
not contrary to contemporary standards of decency are within constitutional
bounds.65 Moreover, the Court asserted that, in the absence of a violation of
contemporary standards of decency, the mere fact that conditions of confinement
may inflict pain does not run afoul of the Constitution because “the Constitution
does not mandate comfortable prisons.”66
In addition to conditions of confinement in prison, the Supreme Court has
applied the Eighth Amendment to affirmative acts of prison staff in exerting
excessive force against inmates.67 In Whitley v. Albers,68 the Court considered an
inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force during a prison riot.69 In

60. See id. at 104 (holding that deliberate indifference to prisoner’s serious medical needs
constitutes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” which is prohibited by Eighth
Amendment); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (“Estelle, we noted, first
applied the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to deprivations that were not specifically
part of the prisoner’s sentence.”).
61. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (“We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976) (plurality opinion))).
62. Id. at 103-04 (arguing that such “standards of decency [are] manifested in modern
legislation” that requires public to care for prisoners who cannot care for themselves).
63. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
64. See id. at 339 (“The question presented is whether the housing of two inmates in a
single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); id. at 347 (applying Estelle).
65. See id. at 347 (“Conditions other than those in Gamble . . . alone or in combination,
may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Such conditions
could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency that we recognized
in Gamble . . . . But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary
standards are not unconstitutional.” (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04)). The Court went on to
note that, even though conditions may be harsh, if such conditions do not violate contemporary
standards of decency, then “they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.” Id.
66. Id. at 349 (asserting that, because conditions are not unconstitutional, they are best
decided by legislative or executive authority).
67. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326-27 (1986) (holding that excessive force may
violate Eighth Amendment, but that no violation occurred in that case because officer acted in
“good-faith effort to restore prison security”).
68. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
69. See id. at 314 (“This case requires us to decide what standard governs a prison
inmate’s claim that prison officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by shooting
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contrast to Estelle’s required mental standard of deliberate indifference in a
conditions of confinement claim, the Whitley court ruled that the proper question
in excessive force cases is “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm.”70
In Hudson v. McMillian,71 the Court extended the Whitley rule to all cases of
excessive force under the Eighth Amendment.72 In so doing, the Court clarified
that the analysis for an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment
includes both an objective and subjective prong.73 For the subjective prong, the
relevant question is whether “the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind.”74 As for the objective prong, the court must determine whether
the alleged wrongdoing was “harmful enough” for constitutional cognizability.75
Whether conduct satisfies the objective prong is necessarily contextual because
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” is given
meaning “from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”76
3.

Circuit Court Precedent on Prison Sexual Abuse

Although the Supreme Court has not considered the issue, the circuit courts
have employed the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in cases
of guard-on-inmate sexual abuse.77 In 1997, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
confronted this issue in Boddie v. Schnieder.78 There, the defendant, a

him during the course of their attempt to quell a prison riot.”).
70. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973))
(reasoning this standard is necessary because of “significant risks to the safety of inmates and
prison staff” that are inherent in attempts by prison staff to resolve disturbance).
71. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
72. See id. at 6-7 (“[W]e hold that whenever prison officials stand accused of using
excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core
judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”).
73. See id. at 8 (“[C]ourts considering a prisoner’s claim must ask both if ‘the officials
act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind’ and if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively
‘harmful enough’ to establish a constitutional violation.” (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 298 (1991))).
74. Id. at 8 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). This standard may vary depending on
context. Compare Whitley, 475 U.S. at 313 (holding standard in excessive force context is
“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm”), with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976) (holding standard in conditions of confinement context is “deliberate
indifference”).
75. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298) (discussing elements
of an Eighth Amendment claim).
76. Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
77. For descriptions of and citations to relevant circuit court decisions, see infra notes
78–105 and accompanying text.
78. See 105 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1997) (framing issue as whether inmates may make Eighth
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correctional officer, sexually harassed the plaintiff, an inmate.79 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant touched his penis, stating, “[Y]ou know your [sic] sexy
black devil, I like you”; that on another occasion the defendant pressed her breasts
into his chest “so hard [he] could feel the points of her nipples against [his] chest”;
and that she again pressed up against him, “vagina against penis pinning [him] to
the door.”80
In holding that sexual abuse may violate the Eighth Amendment, the Boddie
court asserted that such conduct can satisfy both prongs of the Supreme Court’s
test for Eighth Amendment violations.81 On the objective prong, sexual abuse
can be “objectively, sufficiently serious,” because it may cause “severe physical
and psychological harm,” may be contrary to contemporary standards of decency,
and serves no legitimate penological purposes.82 Sexual abuse can also satisfy
the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim because a prison official
may have a sufficiently culpable state of mind to meet the requirement.83
However, the Boddie court held the facts of that case did not objectively rise to
an Eighth Amendment deprivation because the alleged conduct was merely
“isolated episodes of harassment and touching” and thus did not amount to “a
harm of federal constitutional proportions as defined by the Supreme Court.”84
Following Boddie, a number of other federal appellate courts recognized that
sexual abuse may violate the Eighth Amendment, but read the objective prong as

Amendment claims for sexual abuse by correctional officers).
79. See id. at 859-60 (noting that plaintiff believed that prison official mistreated him,
and specifically detailing allegations of sexual misconduct plaintiff experienced at hand of
prison official).
80. Id. Apparently, the second incident occurred after Schnieder stopped Boddie and
accused the inmate of wearing an orange (rather than red) sweatshirt because only prison
employees were permitted to wear orange. See id. at 860 & n.1. When Boddie refused to take
off the sweatshirt, Schnieder pressed herself against him. See id. at 860.
81. See id. at 860-861 (noting that only in “some circumstances” will sexual abuse of a
prisoner violate the prisoner’s rights).
82. See id. (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (discussing objective
element of Eighth Amendment claim).
83. See id. at 861-62 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (discussing
subjective element of Eighth Amendment claim).
84. Id. at 862 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
348-49 & 348 n.13 (1981)) (noting that “not every deviation from an ‘aspiration toward an ideal
environment for long-term confinement’ amounts to a constitutional violation”). However, the
Boddie court conceded that isolated episodes of harassment and touching could give rise to a
state tort claim. See id. at 861.
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requiring that the inmate suffer “harm.”85 For example, in Freitas v. Ault,86 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that sexual abuse of an inmate could violate
the Constitution; however, the court found that there was no constitutional
deprivation because the guard and inmate engaged in a consensual sexual
relationship, and therefore the inmate failed to allege the requisite harm as a result
of the officer’s conduct.87 In Boxer X v. Harris,88 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reached a similar conclusion.89 Although the Boxer X court recognized
that sexual abuse of an inmate may violate the Eighth Amendment, the court held
that no such violation occurred when a prison guard solicited an inmate to
masturbate on threat of reprisal.90 Relying on Boddie and Eleventh Circuit
precedent, the court reasoned that the objective element of an Eighth Amendment
claim requires “more than de minimis injury.”91
Although the aforementioned cases required proof of harm to satisfy the
objective prong, others have foregone the harm inquiry in favor of an emphasis
on the evolving standards of decency.92 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

85. See, e.g. Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335 (8th Cir. 1997); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d
1107 (11th Cir. 2006). See Coker, supra note 12 at 440 (arguing that placing emphasis on injury
in sexual abuse claims has disparate impact on inmates, including contributing to harmful
gender disparity). Coker criticizes the requirement that a plaintiff suffer an injury to state an
Eighth Amendment sexual abuse claim. See id. Notably, Ricks expressly held that injury is not
dispositive of the issue and that the objective prong is better analyzed with reference to
“evolving standards of decency.” Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 477 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010)) (holding that “the absence of force or injury will
not doom a sexual abuse claim outright” and even though “physical injury will certainly signal
severity, it is not the touchstone for objective seriousness”).
86. 109 F.3d 1335 (8th Cir. 1997).
87. See id. at 1339 (“[W]e hold that, at the very least, welcome and voluntary sexual
interactions, no matter how inappropriate, cannot as a matter of law constitute ‘pain’ as
contemplated by the Eighth Amendment.”). One commentator has criticized the notion that
prisoners can consent to sex acts with prison officials. See Hannah Belitz, Note, A Right Without
a Remedy: Sexual Abuse in Prison and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.
REV. 291, 297-98 (2018) (arguing inmates cannot give consent to sex with guards because
power imbalance may cause inmates to feel incapable of rejecting guards’ sexual advances).
88. 437 F.3d 1107 (11th Cir. 2006).
89. See id. at 1111 (“In this case, we join other circuits recognizing that severe or
repetitive sexual abuse of a prisoner by a prison official can violate the Eighth Amendment.”).
90. See id. (reasoning that even though exposure of one’s genitals could be “especially
demeaning and humiliating,” forcing inmate to expose self was only a de minimis injury).
91. Id. (“We conclude that a female prison guard’s solicitation of a male prisoner’s
manual masturbation, even under the threat of reprisal, does not present more than de minimis
injury.”). The court relied explicitly on Eleventh Circuit precedent in holding that the objective
element of an Eighth Amendment claim requires more than de minimis injury. See id. (citing
Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002)).
92. See, e.g., Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e recognize
that sexual abuse of prisoners, once passively accepted by society, deeply offends today’s
standards of decency.”); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In such
cases, no lasting physical injury is necessary to state a cause of action. Rather, the only
requirement is that the officer’s actions be ‘offensive to human dignity.’” (quoting Felix v.
McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1991))).
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articulated this standard in Schwenk v. Hartford.93 In holding that a pattern of
sexual abuse of an inmate may implicate the Constitution’s prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment, the Schwenk court reasoned that cruel and unusual
punishment is gauged against “‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.’”94 The court asserted that an Eighth Amendment
claim does not require a lasting physical injury, but rather that the conduct be
“‘offensive to human dignity.’”95 Because a guard-on-inmate sexual assault is
“deeply ‘offensive to human dignity,’” the court held that the plaintiff had
adequately stated a claim of deprivation of Eighth Amendment rights.96
In Crawford v. Cuomo,97 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit clarified its previous stance in Boddie by holding that, because of evolving
standards of decency, the facts of Boddie would not withstand its own test today.98
The court heavily based its analysis on the notion that “the Eighth Amendment
requires courts to ‘look beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”99 In assessing
contemporary standards of decency, the court must review “objective indicia of
consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have
addressed the question.”100 Noting that a significant number of states enacted
laws prohibiting guard-on-inmate sexual contact after Boddie, the Crawford court
found that these legislative enactments demonstrate how society’s beliefs have
evolved on sexual abuse in prisons and that society now considers such abuse to
offend “our most basic principles of just punishment.”101
In an unpublished decision, Obiegbu v. Werlinger,102 the Third Circuit
addressed an Eighth Amendment claim of sexual abuse in which an inmate
alleged that a prison guard grabbed the inmate’s genitals through clothing during
a pat-down search.103 Relying on Boddie, the court paid special attention to the
93. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
94. Id. at 1196 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)).
95. Id. (quoting Felix v. McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, the
court noted that “physical injury” is not required under Eighth Amendment as long as an
“officer’s actions be ‘offensive to human dignity’”. Id.
96. Id. at 1197 (quoting Felix, 939 F.2d at 702 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also id. at 1205
(holding inmate stated a claim for relief under Eighth Amendment).
97. 796 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 2015).
98. See id. at 260 (“In light of this evolution [of contemporary standards of decency],
while the standard articulated in Boddie remains the same, ‘its applicability must change as the
basic mores of society change.’” (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008))).
99. Id. at 259 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010)) (noting that even
though conduct may not have risen to Eighth Amendment violation historically, changing
standards of decency may dictate different outcome today).
100. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005)).
101. See id. at 260 (noting state and federal laws against officer-inmate sexual contact
“make it clear that the sexual abuse of prisoners, once overlooked as a distasteful blight on the
prison system, offends our most basic principles of just punishment”).
102. 581 F. App’x 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2014).
103. See id. at 121 (holding inmate did not state valid Eighth Amendment claim for
sexual abuse when corrections officer touched genitals during pat-down search because “a small
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limited number of instances of sexual abuse alleged here, arguing that a “small
number of incidents in which a prisoner is verbally harassed, touched, and pressed
against without his consent do not amount to [an Eighth Amendment]
violation.”104 Thus, the federal appellate courts have adopted two different
schools of thought regarding Eighth Amendment sexual abuse claims: (1)
requiring proof of objective “harm” that goes beyond a de minimis injury, and (2)
recognizing, based on evolving societal standards of decency, that guard-oninmate sexual abuse may violate the Eighth Amendment without physical
injury.105
III. SEEKING RESTITUTION: THE FACTS OF RICKS V. SHOVER
Against this background of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Third
Circuit was faced with Ricks v. Shover.106 The incident giving rise to this case
occurred on September 17, 2014.107 At that time, Gregory Ricks was an inmate
at Pennsylvania State Corrections facility SCI-Graterford.108 On that morning,
Corrections Officer Paul Keil ordered Ricks to undergo a pat-down search while
walking through a public hallway.109 Lieutenant Shover was also allegedly

number of incidents in which a prisoner is verbally harassed, touched, and pressed against
without his consent do not amount to such a violation”). Other district court opinions have
similarly relied on Obiegbu for the proposition that a prisoner suffering only “isolated” incidents
of inappropriate behavior do not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Kokinda
v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:16-CV-1580-MRH-CRE, 2017 WL 3897378, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa.
Aug. 9, 2017) (holding inmate did not state valid Eighth Amendment claim when alleging that
corrections officer displayed “latent sexual interest” for inmate and, on numerous occasions,
stared at inmate’s groin area “for an uncomfortable duration” while inmate wore only underwear
in cell), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 2:16-CV-1580-MRH-CRE, 2017
WL 3912350 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2017); Hann v. Southwoods State Prison, No. CV-14-3752RBK-AMD, 2016 WL 3638107, at *4 (D.N.J. July 6, 2016) (holding prisoner did not state valid
Eighth Amendment claim when alleging corrections officer touched inmate on shoulder and
told inmate that officer liked inmate); Burch v. Thomas, No. 7:14-cv-01812-CLS-JEO, 2015
WL 10911325, at *2-3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2015) (holding inmate did not state claim under
Eighth Amendment when alleging corrections officer groped inmate’s genitals and ran hand
between inmate’s buttocks during pat-down search), report and recommendation adopted, No.
7:14-CV-01812-CLS-JEO, 2016 WL 2865802 (N.D. Ala. May 17, 2016).
104. Obiegbu, 581 F. App’x at 121 (citing Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d
Cir. 1997)).
105. Compare Boxer X, 437 F.3d at 1111 (requiring more than de minimis injury to
prevail on Eighth Amendment sexual abuse claim) with Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1196 (requiring
only that alleged conduct be “offensive to human dignity”).
106. 891 F.3d 468 (3d Cir. 2018).
107. See id. at 472 (describing facts of case).
108. See id. (noting Ricks’s confinement at SCI-Graterford); see also id. at 472 n.1
(noting that after events at issue, Ricks was released on parole and is no longer incarcerated).
109. See id. at 472 (stating that events occurred during morning line movements while
Ricks was on his way to law library); see also id. at 472 n.2 (noting in original complaint, Ricks
identified defendant as “C/O Kile,” but thereafter Commonwealth of Pennsylvania identified
defendant as “Corrections Officer Paul Keil”).
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present and observed the pat-down.110
While being patted-down from behind, Ricks felt Keil’s erect penis “rubbing
up against” his buttocks.111 Ricks stepped away from Keil, protesting the sexual
Ricks then informed Shover that Keil had touched him
contact.112
inappropriately.113 After Ricks explained further, Shover approached him and
“slammed [him] in the . . . wall.”114 Shover then led Ricks back to his cell in
handcuffs.115 Shover also allegedly directed several racial slurs at Ricks in the
process.116
Ricks subsequently brought a civil action under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Keil and Shover in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.117 In his complaint, Ricks sought monetary and injunctive relief
for racial discrimination, harassment, sexual abuse, and excessive force.118
The district court dismissed Ricks’s complaint for failure to state a claim.119
The court based its decision on the Third Circuit’s non-precedential opinion in
Obiegbu, citing it for the proposition that a small number of incidents of sexual
abuse do not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.120 Ricks appealed the
trial court’s order.121 However, on appeal, Ricks only pursued his claims for
sexual abuse and excessive force.122
IV. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S JUDGMENT ON PRISON

110. See id. at 472 (explaining that Lt. Shover was overseeing line movement and that
entire series of events was allegedly captured on video camera).
111. Id. (providing that Ricks was clothed at time of alleged sexual contact).
112. See id. (noting Ricks’s statement that Keil was “on [his] (ASS)”).
113. See id. (describing Ricks’s statement to Lt. Shover that Keil was “[r]ubbing [u]p
against my [b]ehind with his genitals”).
114. Id. (noting that Ricks alleged injuries as result of this force including “[b]usted”
nose and lip, as well as injuries to his head, neck, and back).
115. See id. (describing aftermath of Ricks’s statement to Shover).
116. See id. (recounting that Ricks alleged prior instances of harassment by Shover).
117. See id. at 472-73 (describing procedure of case); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996)
(providing private cause of action for deprivations of constitutional rights carried out “under
color of” state law).
118. See Ricks, 891 F.3d at 472 (describing Ricks’s complaint).
119. See id. at 472-73 (noting that district court initially granted Ricks leave to amend
complaint, but that Ricks did not amend his complaint within allotted time period). Thus, the
district court accordingly dismissed Ricks’s complaint with prejudice. See id. at 473 (noting
that district court dismissed complaint).
120. See id. at 472-73 (stating that district court relied on Obiegbu to dismiss Ricks’s
Eighth Amendment claim). For a discussion of Obiegbu, see supra notes 102-104 and
accompanying text.
121. See Ricks, 891 F.3d at 473 (explaining that Ricks filed his appeal after lower court
dismissed case with prejudice).
122. See id. at 472 n.4 (noting Ricks did not pursue claims for racial discrimination or
harassment on appeal).
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SEXUAL ABUSE

In reaching its decision, the Ricks court acknowledged that there is no
Supreme Court precedent on the issue.123 However, the court stated that it was
guided by both the Supreme Court’s holding in Farmer that inmate-on-inmate
sexual assault can implicate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment and the Supreme Court’s excessive force jurisprudence.124
Additionally, the Ricks court considered other circuits’ approaches that applied
excessive force principles to sexual abuse claims.125
Citing the Second Circuit’s decision in Boddie, the Ricks court employed the
Supreme Court’s two-prong excessive force test.126 The Ricks court noted that
the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim requires that sexual abuse be
“‘objectively, sufficiently serious,’” which can be satisfied by “‘severe or
repetitive sexual abuse of an inmate by a prison officer.’”127 The court described
the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim as satisfied in cases “[w]here
no legitimate law enforcement or penological purposes can be inferred from the
defendant’s alleged conduct.”128
Ricks argued that, based on Crawford, the objective and subjective elements
of an Eighth Amendment claim should be consolidated such that the finding of a
lack of penological purpose for sexualized contact would be dispositive;
however, the Third Circuit disagreed.129 In doing so, the court distinguished
Crawford by noting that the conduct at issue there was a body-cavity search,
which the court found to be “objectively intrusive.”130 Additionally, the court
123. See id. at 473-74 (noting Supreme Court has not addressed issue of guard-oninmate sexual abuse).
124. See id. (“Though the Supreme Court has not addressed sexual abuse of inmates by
prison officials, courts grappling with this issue have drawn from the Supreme Court’s
excessive force precedents and its holding in Farmer v. Brennan that sexual assaults of inmates
by inmates can implicate the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.”).
125. See id. (providing citations to other federal appellate decisions holding sexual abuse
can violate Eighth Amendment). The Ricks court particularly relied on Boddie, citing it
repeatedly when analyzing the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment
claim. See id. at 474 (“In particular, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s
reasoning in its two landmark Eighth Amendment sexual abuse cases informs our analysis.”).
126. See id. at 474 (citing Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997)) (noting
two-prong test used in Boddie).
127. Id. (quoting Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861).
128. Id. (citing Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861).
129. See id. at 476 (“Ricks has urged us to adopt a standard that would collapse the
subjective and objective inquiries, so that a finding of a lack of penological purpose would be
determinative. He draws this standard from Crawford . . . . We do not take issue with the focus
of the analysis by other courts on whether the official performing the search had a penological
purpose . . . . That is, when a search involves intrusive, intimate touching to ensure that
contraband and weapons are not present, an inquiry into its purpose is legitimate.”).
130. Id. (“Absent a legitimate penological purpose, the type of touching involved in, for
instance, a body-cavity search, would be undoubtedly cruel and unusual. And a desire to
humiliate the inmate or gratify the officer—inferred through the officer’s conduct—is a
reasonable way to distinguish between invasive touching that is permitted by law to ensure
safety and that which is not. An analysis focused on intent of the officer is therefore appropriate
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concluded that contemporary standards of decency had not evolved to provide for
a zero-tolerance policy towards all sexual abuse in prisons because federal law
only proscribes “severe misconduct” and because state law only criminalizes
“inmate rape, sexual assault, and ‘indecent contact.’”131
In its analysis, the Ricks court noted that the cases decided by the other
circuits did not necessarily establish a floor level for the objective standard.132
However, the court ultimately concluded that, although Keil’s conduct was
“inappropriate and unprofessional,” it did not, as alleged in Ricks’s complaint,
rise to the level of objective seriousness because there is no way to determine
whether the alleged conduct was part of a “legitimate pat-down” absent more
specific pleading and because “the episode as alleged appeared to be isolated”
and “momentary.”133 However, because Ricks was not initially represented by
counsel in filing this lawsuit, the court granted Ricks the opportunity to amend
his complaint to allege facts that would meet the legal requirements of an Eighth
Amendment claim.134

when evaluating whether an objectively intrusive search is constitutional.”); accord id. (“[In a
previous decision,] [w]e found a focus on intent necessary to demarcate permissible from ultra
vires invasiveness. Accordingly, the inquiry to define culpable state of mind versus legitimate
penological purpose is a necessary, but not sufficient, inquiry. Fusing the subjective and
objective inquiries, as Ricks urges we must, would constitutionalize any alleged touch, if the
corrections officer lacked a penological purpose. We decline to entirely eliminate the objective
prong of the analysis by collapsing it with the subjective prong. That is to say, even if sexualized
touching lacks a penological purpose, it may still fall below the threshold of constitutional
cognizability based on a lack of objective seriousness.”).
131. Id. at 477-78 (“In recent years, both the federal government and all but two of the
states have passed legislation outlawing sexual activity between guards and inmates. . . .
[T]hese enactments reflect a societal standard that conduct falling outside the definition for
‘rape’ nonetheless is taken seriously and compensable by damages at law. They do not,
however, compel a finding that all inappropriate touching is per se unconstitutional. The Prison
Rape Elimination Act . . . explicitly seeks to ‘establish a zero tolerance standard for the
incidence of prison rape in the prisons of the United States.’ . . . But the statute defines ‘rape’
so as to overtly encompass severe misconduct. . . . Similarly, the Prison Litigation Reform
Act . . . limits recovery for mental and emotional injuries unless a litigant can show ‘physical
injury or the commission of a sexual act.’ . . . We therefore do not read the PREA and the PLRA
as evincing Congressional intent to create a zero-tolerance standard for minor sexual
touching.”).
132. See id. at 479 (“Nevertheless, a situation falling below the level of objective
seriousness present in those cases is not per se excluded from constitutional cognizance. This
is a fact-specific inquiry.”).
133.
Id. at 478-79 (“Nevertheless, a situation falling below the level of objective
seriousness present in those cases is not per se excluded from constitutional cognizance. This
is a fact-specific inquiry. Because we cannot definitively say that, consistent with his complaint,
Ricks could not plead other facts relevant to objective seriousness under the standard we have
articulated, he should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to cure his complaint by amendment.
To be sure, Officer Keil’s alleged behavior was, by any standard, inappropriate and
unprofessional. It is not clear from the face of Ricks’ complaint whether the touching was
incidental to a legitimate pat-down search. Yet, the episode as alleged appeared to be isolated,
momentary, and avoided by Ricks’ ability to step away from the offending touch.”).
134. See id. at 479 (emphasizing that pro se litigants often lack ability to meet the
requirements of modern litigation). This holding allows Ricks to attempt to allege more facts
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V. “JUST” DESSERTS? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RICKS V. SHOVER

The Third Circuit’s decision in Ricks v. Shover is a step in the right direction
toward fully vindicating the rights of prisoners to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.135 However, the court’s decision has its problems.136 By requiring
that sexualized touching rise to an objectively serious level before a violation of
the Constitution occurs, the court tacitly accepted that a prison official may
escape liability for sexual abuse if the abuse is not “serious” enough.137 The Ricks
court should not have held that Eighth Amendment claims for guard-on-inmate
sexualized touching may be dismissed for lack of objective seriousness.138 This
is for two critical reasons: (1) because our community’s standards of decency
have evolved to the point of requiring a zero-tolerance policy for the unjustified
sexualized touching of inmates and (2) because sexual abuse cases are
categorically distinguishable from excessive force claims, rendering it

relating to the incident, which may be able to meet the standard for Eighth Amendment claims
that the Third Circuit now articulates.
135. Cf. id. at 479 (“Absent more specific allegations as to the severity of Keil’s conduct
or the surrounding context, including the need for the search, we cannot conclude that he
plausibly violated Ricks’ right to be free from ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ By this, we do
not intend to trivialize Ricks’ allegations, nor suggest that he did not suffer harm. Rather, the
Constitution may require more detail in his pleadings before a federal court recognizes his
claim. We have maintained that imprisoned pro se litigants ‘often lack the resources and
freedom necessary to comply with the technical rules of modern litigation.’ . . . Now that Ricks
is represented ably by pro bono counsel, he should be given another chance to amend his
complaint to allege facts specifying the incident’s seriousness or severity, as well as its purpose,
and any other facts that would provide context. Whether his complaint as amended will be
sufficient is a matter yet to be determined. In particular, the controlling legal principles we
announce today must be applied to the facts alleged. But Ricks should have the opportunity to
present allegations with due consideration to the law which controls his case. We will therefore
vacate the District Court’s dismissal of his sexual abuse claim against Keil and remand so that
he can re-plead his claim.”).
136.
Cf. id. at 477 (“Whether conduct is objectively cruel and unusual is better
considered with sensitivity to ‘evolving standards of decency.’ . . . Ricks posits that the current
standard vis-à-vis sexualized touching in prison contexts is ‘zero tolerance.’ . . . We are aware
that societal norms surrounding unwanted sexual attention are changing rapidly, and we are
mindful that behavior that may not have warranted damages in the past may so warrant
today. We nonetheless are not persuaded that the current standard is zero tolerance for all minor
sexualized touching in prison, such that all such claims are objectively serious to a constitutional
degree.” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102 (1976))).
137. Cf. id. at 476 (“That is to say, even if sexualized touching lacks a penological
purpose, it may still fall below the threshold of constitutional cognizability based on a lack of
objective seriousness.”).
138. Contra id. at 477 (“Whether conduct is objectively cruel and unusual is better
considered with sensitivity to ‘evolving standards of decency.’ . . . Ricks posits that the current
standard vis-à-vis sexualized touching in prison contexts is ‘zero tolerance.’ . . . We are aware
that societal norms surrounding unwanted sexual attention are changing rapidly, and we are
mindful that behavior that may not have warranted damages in the past may so warrant today.
We nonetheless are not persuaded that the current standard is zero tolerance for all minor
sexualized touching in prison, such that all such claims are objectively serious to a constitutional
degree.” (citations omitted)).
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inappropriate to apply the excessive force standard to cases of sexual abuse in
prison.139
A. Evolving Standards of Decency and Legislative Responses to Prison Sexual
Abuse
In interpreting the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the
Supreme Court has repeatedly “affirmed the necessity of referring to ‘the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”140
According to the Court, the touchstone for identifying society’s standards of
decency is “a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular
by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”141 After
considering the judgment of the legislatures, the Court may bring its own
reasoning to bear, asking “whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment
reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”142
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the death penalty provides a case
study in changing societal standards of decency.143 In 1989, the Supreme Court
held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause did not prohibit the use of

139.
For a discussion of evolving standards of decency with respect to Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, see infra notes 140-60 and accompanying text. See also Crawford
v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 259-60 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that “objective indicia of consensus”
primarily seen through recent state and federal legislative enactments, make clear that “the
sexual abuse of prisoners, once overlooked as a distasteful blight on the prison system, offends
our most basic principles of just punishment”). For a discussion of the differences between
sexual abuse and excessive force cases in connection to Eighth Amendment rights, and why
those differences render it inappropriate to apply the excessive force standard in sexual abuse
cases, see infra notes 161–81 and accompanying text.
140. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion)) (holding that imposition of death penalty on juveniles
violates Eighth Amendment).
141. Id. at 564 (explaining starting point for court to determine standards of decency).
142. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (describing approach). The Atkins
court went on to find that, in addition to the consensus on execution of the mentally disabled,
the Court’s own jurisprudence on the death penalty provides additional reasons to prevent such
executions. See id. at 317-18. For example, the Court noted, “there is a serious question as to
whether either justification that we have recognized as a basis for the death penalty applies to
mentally retarded offenders.” Id. at 318-19. In regard to retribution—the first purpose for the
death penalty—the Court noted that “the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily
depends on the culpability of the offender,” and the “mentally retarded” are less morally
culpable than the average criminal offender. Id. at 319. On deterrence—the second purpose
for the death penalty—the Court stated that “it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments
that make these defendants less morally culpable . . . that also make it less likely that they can
process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their
conduct based upon that information.” Id. at 320. In addition, the Court further noted that the
reduced mental capacity of such defendants may frustrate procedural protections in death
penalty cases, such as the ability to give meaningful assistance to counsel. Id. at 320-21.
143. Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338-39 (1989) (holding death penalty
constitutional when imposed on inmates with “mental retardation”), with Atkins, 536 U.S. at
321 (holding death penalty unconstitutional when imposed on “mentally retarded” inmates).
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the death penalty on mentally disabled defendants.144 The Court largely based its
decision on the fact that, at that time, only one State had enacted a statute
prohibiting the execution of mentally disabled persons.145 Because of the paucity
of state legislative enactments, the Court reasoned that “there is insufficient
evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded
people . . . .”146
However, in 2002, the Supreme Court changed course in Atkins v.
Virginia.147 There the Court found that, in the intervening time, no less than
sixteen states had passed laws prohibiting the execution of the mentally
disabled.148 The Court additionally noted that the “consistency of the direction
of change” strongly suggested that societal standards of decency had evolved on
the issue.149
Applying this rationale in the sexual abuse context is telling.150 As noted
above, every state legislature and the District of Columbia impose criminal
sanctions on correctional staff who engage in sex acts with prisoners.151 Of these,
thirty-five states and the District of Columbia broadly prohibit “sexual conduct”

144. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 340 (holding death penalty constitutional when imposed on
inmates with “mental retardation”).
145.
See id. at 333-34 (noting that only Georgia provided such a statute and that
Maryland had recently enacted similar legislation, which had not yet taken effect).
146. Id. at 335 (“The public sentiment expressed in these and other polls and resolutions
may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of contemporary
values upon which we can rely. But at present, there is insufficient evidence of a national
consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us to
conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.”); accord id. at 334 (“In
our view, the two state statutes prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added
to the 14 States that have rejected capital punishment completely, do not provide sufficient
evidence at present of a national consensus.”). The Court had previously held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the execution of the mentally insane, finding evidence of a national
consensus where no state specifically authorized execution of the insane and where twenty-six
states expressly forbade it. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 n.2 (1986) (holding that
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits execution of mentally
insane).
147. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding execution of “mentally retarded” inmates
violative of Eighth Amendment).
148. See id. at 314-15 (noting various states came to prevent execution of mentally
disabled persons). Specifically, the Court found that between 1990 and 2001, Kentucky,
Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York,
Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina had all
passed statutes prohibiting the execution of the mentally disabled. See id. (describing state
statutes). Additionally, the Texas legislature had unanimously passed a similar statute, but the
governor of Texas vetoed it. See id. at 315.
149.
Id. at 315-16 (“[T]oday our society views mentally retarded offenders as
categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”).
150. Cf. Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 260 (2d Cir. 2015) (determining objective
indicia of consensus as to sexual abuse in prisons by examining relevant laws and policies).
151. For citations to state statutes addressing sexual guard-on-inmate contact, see supra
note 38.
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or “sexual contact” between guards and inmates.152 Similarly, eleven other states

152. See ALA. CODE § 14-11-31(a) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any employee to
engage in sexual conduct with a person who is in the custody of the Department of
Corrections . . . .”); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.427(a) (2018) (“An offender commits the crime of
sexual assault in the fourth degree if (1) while employed in a state correctional facility . . . the
offender engages in sexual contact with a person who the offender knows is committed to the
custody of the Department of Corrections to serve a term of imprisonment . . . .”); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-14-127(a)(2) (2009) (prohibiting sexual contact); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-701(1)
(2010) (prohibiting sexual conduct); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-73a(a)(1)(F) (2013) (prohibiting
sexual contact); D.C. CODE § 22-3014 (2013) (prohibiting sexual contact); GA. CODE ANN. §
16-6-5.1(b)(5) (West 2016) (“A person who has supervisory or disciplinary authority over
another individual commits sexual assault when that person: . . . [i]s an employee or agent of a
correctional facility . . . who engages in sexual contact with such other individual who the actor
knew or should have known is in the custody of such facility.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707732(1)(e)(i) (2018) (prohibiting sexual contact); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6110(1) (West 2018)
(prohibiting sexual contact); ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-9.2(a)(1) (West 2018) (“A person
commits custodial sexual misconduct when . . . he or she is an employee of a penal system and
engages in sexual conduct or sexual penetration with a person who is in the custody of that
penal system . . . .”); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-44.1-3-10(c)(2) (West 2014) (prohibiting sexual
conduct); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.120(1)(b) (West 2018) (prohibiting to sexual contact);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:134.1(A)(2) (2010) (prohibiting “intercourse or any other sexual
conduct”); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 255-A(1)(I) (2016) (“A person is guilty of unlawful sexual
contact if the actor intentionally subjects another person to any sexual contact and . . . [t]he
other person . . . is detained in . . . prison or other institution and the actor has supervisory or
disciplinary authority over the other person.”); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 3-314(b)(2)
(West 2018) (prohibiting “sexual contact, vaginal intercourse, or a sexual act with an inmate”);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268 § 21A (West 2018) (“prohibiting “intentional, inappropriate
contact of a sexual nature”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520c(1)(i) (West 2013)
(prohibiting sexual contact); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.345(1)(m) (West 2010) (prohibiting
sexual conduct); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.145(1) (West 2017) (prohibiting sexual conduct);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(1), (5)(a)(i) (West 2017) (prohibiting sexual contact without
consent, and providing that inmates may not consent to sexual contact “unless the act is part of
a lawful search”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-322.01 (West 2018) (prohibiting “sexual
penetration or sexual contact”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212.187(2) (West 2015) (prohibiting
sexual conduct); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:3(IV)(a)(1) (2018) (prohibiting sexual
contact); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(c)(2) (West 2018) (prohibiting “sexual penetration”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-3(b) (West 2018) (prohibiting sexual contact); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
130.05(3)(e) (McKinney 2018) (providing that an inmate is incapable of consent to sexual acts
with employees of inmate’s prison); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.60 (McKinney 2010)
(criminalizing sexual contact with person incapable of consent); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.120-07(1)(d) (West 2018) (prohibiting sexual contact); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)
(West 2009) (prohibiting sexual contact); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.454(1)(a)(B) (West 2018)
(prohibiting sexual contact); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-1150(B) (2018) (prohibiting sexual
contact); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.6 (2018) (prohibiting “sexual contact or sexual
penetration”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-408(b) (West 2018) (prohibiting “sexual contact or
sexual penetration”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.04(a)(2) (West 2017) (prohibiting “sexual
contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.170(1)(a)(i)-(ii) (West 2018) (prohibiting sexual contact); W. VA . CODE ANN. § 61-8B10(a) (West 2012) (prohibiting “sexual intercourse, sexual intrusion or sexual contact”); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2)(h) (West 2018) (prohibiting “sexual contact or sexual intercourse”);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-304(a)(iii) (West 2018) (prohibiting sexual contact under the
circumstances of subsection (vii)); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vii) (West 2018)
(prohibiting “sexual intrusion” where the “actor is an employee, independent contractor or
volunteer of a state, county, city or town, or privately operated adult or juvenile correctional
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broadly prohibit sexual conduct under various other terms.153 The overwhelming
majority of states broadly define “sexual conduct” as intentional contact with a
person’s clothed or unclothed genitals or “intimate parts” with intent to elicit
sexual gratification or to abuse the victim.154 In contrast, only four states
system . . . and the victim is known or should be known by the actor to be a resident of such
facility or under supervision of the correctional system . . .”).
153. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1419(A)(1) (2011) (emphasis added) (“A person
commits unlawful sexual conduct by intentionally or knowingly engaging in any act of a sexual
nature with an offender who is in the custody of the state department of corrections . . . . For
the purposes of this subsection, ‘person’ means a person who . . . [i]s employed by the state
department of corrections . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 289.6(a)(2) (West 2015) (emphasis
added) (“An employee or officer of a public entity detention facility . . . who engages in sexual
activity with a consenting adult who is confined in a detention facility is guilty of a public
offense.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 794.011(4)(b), (e)(7) (West 2017) (prohibiting “sexual
battery”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.16(1) (West 2015) (prohibiting “a sex act”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5512(a)(1) (West 2018) (prohibiting “sexual intercourse, lewd fondling or touching,
or sodomy”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-104(1) (West 2018) (prohibiting “any sexual
penetration . . . or other sexual act”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-27.31(b) (West 2015)
(prohibiting “vaginal intercourse or a sexual act”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND STAT. ANN. §
3124.2(a) (West 2012) (emphasis added) (“[A] person who is an employee or agent of the
Department of Corrections or a county correctional authority . . . commits a felony of the third
degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or indecent
contact with an inmate . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-412(4)(a) (West 2018) (emphasis
added) (“An actor commits custodial sexual misconduct if the actor commits any of the acts
under Subsection (5) . . . and the actor knows that the individual is a person in custody.”); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-412(5)(a)-(c) (West 2018) (“Acts referred to in subsection 4(a) are the
following acts when committed with the intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to
any individual or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any individual
regardless of the sex of any participant: (a) touching the anus, buttocks, pubic area, or any part
of the genitals of a person in custody; (b) touching the breast of a female person in custody; or
(c) otherwise taking indecent liberties with a person in custody.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
3257(a)(1) (West 2018) (prohibiting “a sexual act”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4(A)(iii) (West
2014) (providing criminal sanctions for correctional staff who “sexually abuse[]” an inmate).
154. This includes at least thirty-six states and the District of Columbia. See ALA. CODE
§ 14-11-30(3)(b)(1)-(3) (2018) (“Sexual contact [means] [a]ny known touching for the purpose
of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse of the following: (1) The sexual or other intimate parts
of the victim by the actor. (2) The sexual or other intimate parts of the actor by the victim. (3)
The clothing covering the immediate area of the sexual or other intimate parts of the victim or
actor.”); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.900(b)(60)(A)(i)-(ii) (West 2018) (defining “sexual
contact”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1419(D)(1)(a) (defining “act of a sexual nature”); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(11) (2017) (defining “sexual contact”); CAL. PENAL CODE §
289.6(d)(5) (West 2015) (“As used in this section, ‘sexual activity’ means . . . [t]he rubbing or
touching of the breasts or sexual organs of another, or of oneself in the presence of and with
knowledge of another, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions,
or sexual desires of oneself or another.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401(2) (West 2013)
(“‘Intimate parts’ means the external genitalia or the perineum or the anus or the buttocks or the
pubes or the breast of any person.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401(4) (West 2013)
(“‘Sexual contact’ means the knowing touching of the victim’s intimate parts . . . for the
purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(3)
(West 2018) (defining “sexual contact” as contact with victim’s “intimate parts”); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(8) (West 2018) (“‘Intimate parts’ means the genital area or any substance
emitted therefrom, groin, anus or any substance emitted therefrom, inner thighs, buttocks or
breasts.”); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3011(9), 3014 (West 2009) (defining “sexual contact”); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(a)(2) (West 2016) (defining “intimate parts”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-
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expressly limit the statutorily prohibited conduct to “penetration.”155
Thus, the overwhelming trend among state legislatures is not only to prohibit
the rape of prisoners by prison officials but also to establish a zero-tolerance

5.1(a)(4) (West 2016) (defining “sexual contact” as contact “involving the intimate parts of
either person for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
707-700 (West 2018) (defining “sexual contact”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-0.1 (West
2011) (defining “sexual conduct”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-9.2(g)(4) (West 2018)
(defining “sexual conduct”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(7) (West 2018) (defining “sexual
contact”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-a, § 251(1)(D) (2018) (defining “sexual contact”); MD.
CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 3-301(e)(1) (West 2016) (defining “sexual contact”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(f) (West 2014) (defining “intimate parts”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520a(q)(iii) (West 2014) (defining “sexual contact”); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.341(11)(a)(i), (iii) (West 2013) (defining “sexual contact”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.010(6)
(West 2017) (defining “sexual contact”); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(67)(a)-(b) (West
2018) (defining “sexual contact”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-318(5) (West 2018) (defining
“sexual contact”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212.187(3)(a) (West 2015) (defining “sexual
conduct”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:3(IV)(c) (2018) (defining “sexual contact”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(d) (West 2012) (defining “sexual contact”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:141(e) (West 2012) (defining “intimate parts”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(3) (McKinney 2010)
(“‘Sexual contact’ means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person for the
purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. It includes the touching of the actor by the
victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or through clothing,
as well as the emission of ejaculate by the actor upon any part of the victim, clothed or
unclothed.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-02(5) (West 2018) (defining “sexual contact”); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.305(6) (West 2018) (defining “sexual contact”); 18 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (West 2014) (“‘Indecent contact’ [means] [a]ny touching of the
sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual
desire, in any person.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(d) (2018) (defining “intimate parts”); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-23-1150(C)(2) (2018) (defining “sexual contact”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2222-7.1 (2018) (defining “sexual contact”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(2) (West 2013)
(defining “intimate parts”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(6) (West 2013) (defining “sexual
contact”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(2) (West 2005) (defining “sexual contact”); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-412(5)(a)-(c) (West 2018) (defining prohibited sexual contact); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.10(2) (West 2018) (defining “intimate parts”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.267.10(6)(a) (West 2018) (defining “sexual abuse”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(2)
(West 2007) (defining “sexual contact”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(6) (West 2007)
(defining “sexual contact”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(5)(b)(1)(a) (West 2018) (defining
“sexual contact”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-301(a)(ii) (West 2018) (defining “intimate parts”);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-301(a)(vi) (West 2018) (defining “sexual contact”); see also State v.
Hart, 687 So. 2d 94, 96 (La. 1997) (“Because of the nature of the relationship between prisoners
and those who exercise direct authority over them while they are incarcerated, we think the
legislature intended to make the statute as broad as possible to prohibit any and all conduct
which might be interpreted as sexual.”).
155. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 780A(a) (2018) (prohibiting “sexual intercourse or
sexual penetration with a person who is in custody . . .”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(E)(2)
(West 2009) (prohibiting “criminal sexual penetration”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1111(A)(7) (West 2018) (prohibiting “sexual intercourse involving vaginal or anal
penetration”); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-25-24 (West 2018) (prohibiting “sexual
penetration”); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-37-1 (West 2018) (defining “sexual penetration”
as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse, or any other intrusion,
however slight, by any part of a person’s body or by any object into the genital or anal openings
of another person’s body, or the victim’s own body upon the accused’s instruction, but emission
of semen is not required”).
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policy for sexual contact in general.156 Notably, the state legislatures have
responded swiftly and consistently to the rise in sexual abuse in prisons.157 As
recently as 1997, only eighteen states and the District of Columbia had statutory
provisions criminalizing guard-on-inmate sexual contact.158 Since 1997,
however, the remaining thirty-two states have all prohibited such conduct.159 A
consensus of sixteen state statutes enacted over the course of thirteen years was
strong enough to show that evolving standards of decency prohibit the execution
of the mentally disabled.160 By that same reasoning, a similar consensus of thirtytwo state statutes passed over twenty-two years should be considered sufficient
to demonstrate that evolving standards of decency in our society establish a zerotolerance policy toward sexual abuse of inmates.
B. Sexual Punishments: The Dissimilarity Between Sexual Abuse and Excessive
Force
Under the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis, reviewing
contemporary standards of decency is only the starting point in determining
whether there was a constitutional deprivation, and a court may go on to
“determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the
punishment in question violates the Constitution.”161 In doing so, the court’s
“own judgment is ‘brought to bear,’” and the court must ask “whether there is
reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its
legislators.”162 Although the Ricks court did not expressly state that sexual abuse
is a legitimate punishment, its holding troublingly implies that otherwise
unjustified sexual abuse of inmates may be a legitimate incident to a prisoner’s

156. See Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 259-60 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing trend
among state legislatures to prohibit sexual conduct between guards and prisoners).
157. See id. at 260 (recognizing that consistent direction of these state statutes “reflect[s]
the deep moral indignation that has replaced what had been society’s passive acceptance of the
problem of sexual abuse in prison”).
158. See id. at 259 (“At the time Boddie was written, 18 states and the District of
Columbia expressly criminalized corrections officers’ sexual contact with inmates.”). These
states were Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. See id. at 259 n.5 (providing citations to relevant
state statutes).
159. See id. at 259 (“Today, all but two states criminalize sexual contact between
inmates and corrections officers.”); id. at 259 n.6 (noting that thirty states have criminalized
guard-on-inmate sexual contact after 1997 since Boddie and providing citations to relevant state
statutes).
160. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002) (describing state statutes
prohibiting execution of mentally disabled and offering helpful comparison as to how statewide consensus demonstrates evolving standards of decency mandate zero-tolerance policy).
161. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 572 (2005)) (describing Supreme Court’s analysis in Eighth Amendment cases).
162. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (2002) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1997)
(plurality opinion)).
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sentence under the Constitution.163
Because sexual abuse is readily
distinguishable from physical force and because the recognized purposes of
criminal punishment cannot support sexual abuse, sexual abuse cases should be
analyzed independently of excessive force cases under the Eighth Amendment.164
Specifically, courts should not require an objective element for sexual abuse
claims.
1.

Sexual Abuse as Distinguishable from Excessive Force

In Hudson, the Supreme Court stated that “not . . . every malevolent touch
by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.”165 Circuit courts of
appeal, including the Third Circuit in Ricks, have utilized this statement to
conclude that only “‘objectively, sufficiently serious’” conduct may violate the
Eighth Amendment.166 Importantly, however, the Supreme Court made this
statement in the context of excessive force, recognizing in Hudson that some
force is to be expected and accepted in prisons because of the need to maintain
and restore discipline.167
Sexual abuse is another story. In discussing the potential liability of prison
officials for inmate-on-inmate sexual abuse, the Supreme Court asserted that
being sexually assaulted “is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society.’”168 Unlike the use of force, then, the
Supreme Court does not consider sexual assault to be an acceptable part of a
prisoner’s sentence.169 Accordingly, a standard meant to weed out less serious
uses of force that are needed to maintain and restore discipline—when the
Supreme Court has accepted force itself as necessary in prisons—should not be
applied in cases of sexual abuse because the Supreme Court has never considered

163.
See Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 477 (2018) (noting conduct must be
“objectively cruel and unusual” according to “evolving standards of decency” in order to
amount to constitutional violation).
164. See Sigler, supra note 13 (describing different philosophical justifications for
sentencing and punishment and arguing that no justification supports prison rape as valid form
of punishment).
165. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (discussing Eighth Amendment in
context of excessive force).
166. Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (requiring punishment to be “objectively, sufficiently serious”);
accord Ricks, 891 F.3d at 475 (requiring that “the incident be objectively, sufficiently
intolerable and cruel”). United States district courts have similarly cited Farmer in the sexual
abuse context. See, e.g., Fenlon v. Peters, No. 6:16-cv-397-SI, 2016 WL 4487855, at *1 (D.
Or. 2016) (requiring conduct to be “objectively unreasonable”); De’lonta v. Clarke, No. 7:11cv-00483, 2013 WL 209489, at *4 (W.D. Va. 2013) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834)
(requiring punishment to be “objectively, sufficiently serious”).
167. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (holding that, in excessive force context, officer’s mental
state in applying excessive force is essential to analysis).
168. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
169. See id. (noting that being sexually assaulted in prison is not part of sentence
imposed on prisoners).
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sexual abuse to be a legitimate part of a prisoner’s punishment.170 In contrast to
the use of force, it is not “excessive” sexual abuse that runs afoul of the
Constitution, but sexual abuse generally, and therefore an objective requirement
should not be required in cases of guard-on-inmate sexual abuse.171
2.

The Absence of Justification for Prison Sexual Abuse

The Supreme Court has held that the purposes of punishment are relevant to
the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, such that a punishment “lacking any
legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the
offense.”172 The Sentencing Reform Act identifies the purposes of punishment
that a court should consider in imposing a sentence.173 Congress includes several
justifications for punishment in the act, such as deterrence of future criminal
conduct; incapacitation of the offender to protect the public from future crimes;
rehabilitation of the offender; and retribution, which includes the purpose “to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense.”174
One commentator notes that none of the traditional justifications for
punishment support prison rape as a valid form of punishment.175 Under
utilitarian purposes of punishment—including deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation—the negative societal consequences of imposing prison sexual
abuse as a punishment outweigh the positive.176 This is due not only to the
“unhappy consequences associated with the offender’s experience of the
sanction” but also to the fact that “punitive rape could be expected to brutalize
and corrupt our own humanity . . . and also to foster sadism and cruelty among
those who administer criminal punishment and society more generally.”177
Additionally, the notion that offenders should receive a punishment they morally
deserve cannot be the basis for prison rape as a punishment for a rapist because
“such treatment is inconsistent with the principle of respect for humanity that the

170. Cf. id. (“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’”).
171. But see id. (noting that prison officials violate Eighth Amendment only when both
objective and subjective requirements are met).
172. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010) (holding no traditional purpose for
punishment justifies sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders).
173. See Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7) (2010) (describing factors
to be considered by sentencing court in imposing sentence, including nature of offense, history
of defendant, and purposes of punishment).
174.
Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A); accord id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7) (describing penological
purposes of retributivism, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
175.
See Sigler, supra note 13, at 562-65 (describing different philosophical
justifications for sentencing and punishment and arguing that no justification supports prison
rape as valid form of punishment).
176.
See id. at 564 (arguing prison rape does not satisfy utilitarian purposes of
punishment).
177. Id. (arguing that “rape as a form of punishment is likely to be disutilitarian”).
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retributive account of punishment presupposes.”178
Like the use of excessive force, there may be legitimate reasons for a prison
guard to touch an inmate’s intimate parts, such as searching for contraband.179
But, such reasons implicate the subjective—not objective—element of an Eighth
Amendment claim because they evoke the question of whether there was a
penological justification for the touching or whether the guard acted with intent
to elicit sexual gratification or to abuse the inmate.180 These considerations
require that the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim be the locus for
assessing the constitutional permissibility of guard-on-inmate sexual contact.181
VI. REHABILITATING PRISON: THE FUTURE OF SEXUAL ABUSE CLAIMS AFTER
RICKS V. SHOVER
Although the Third Circuit’s recognition that a correctional officer’s sexual
abuse of an inmate may violate the Eighth Amendment is a welcome step, it does
not go far enough to adequately vindicate the constitutional rights of prisoners.182
The decision is particularly problematic in that it tacitly allows prison officials to
engage in minor sexual contact with prisoners—even with wrongful intent—
without running afoul of the Constitution.183 Effectively, Ricks v. Shover
provides a loophole to allow prison officials to sexually abuse prisoners in a way
that does not amount to “objective seriousness” and fails to provide prisoners a
remedy for the deprivation of their Eighth Amendment rights.184
In order to secure a more meaningful remedy for prisoners, courts should
178. Id. (relying heavily on retributivist philosopher Immanuel Kant for argument that
rapists do not morally deserve rape as punishment).
179. See Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2015) (“In determining
whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, the principal inquiry is whether the
contact is incidental to legitimate official duties, such as a justifiable pat frisk or strip search, or
by contrast whether it is undertaken to arouse or gratify the officer or humiliate the inmate.”).
Indeed, many states specifically provide that sexual contact that occurs during the course of a
legitimate search or during other acts with a penological justification do not fall within the
statutory prohibition of sexualized guard-on-inmate touching. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-7-701(2)(b) (West 2010) (“‘Sexual conduct’ does not include acts of an employee
of a correctional institution . . . that are performed to carry out the necessary duties of the
employee or the person with custody.”); accord Crawford, 796 F.3d at 258 (noting prison
security and safety may necessitate highly personal searches).
180.
See Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 2018) (describing issue in
subjective prong as question of whether “no legitimate law enforcement or penological purpose
can be inferred from the defendant’s alleged conduct”).
181. Cf. Crawford, 796 F.3d at 257 (“A corrections officer’s intentional contact with an
inmate’s genitalia or other intimate area, which serves no penological purpose and is undertaken
with the intent to gratify the officer’s sexual desire or humiliate the inmate, violates the Eighth
Amendment.”).
182. For a complete argument of this position and a description of an alternate test, see
supra notes 135–81 and accompanying text.
183. See Ricks, 891 F.3d at 476 (“[E]ven if sexualized touching lacks a penological
purpose, it may still fall below the threshold of constitutional cognizability based on a lack of
objective seriousness.”).
184. See id. (requiring objective prong for Eighth Amendment sexual abuse claim).
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recognize that the applicability of any test for prison sexual abuse “‘must change
as the basic mores of society change.’”185 Contemporary standards of decency
now mandate a zero-tolerance policy for guard-on-inmate sexual abuse.186
Therefore, all instances of sexualized touching of an inmate committed without
penological justification and with the intent to elicit sexual gratification or to
abuse or humiliate the inmate should give rise to a claim under the Eighth
Amendment.187

185. Crawford, 796 F.3d at 260 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419
(2008)) (noting importance of assessing contemporary standards of decency when conducting
Eighth Amendment analysis).
186. For an argument that contemporary standards now require a zero-tolerance policy
to sexual abuse in prisons, see supra notes 135–81 and accompanying text.
187. See Crawford, 796 F.3d at 257 (“[I]ntentional contact with an inmate’s genitalia or
other intimate area, which serves no penological purpose and is undertaken with the intent to
gratify the officer’s sexual desire or humiliate the inmate, violates the Eighth Amendment.”).
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